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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS -
COUNSEL'S PRESENCE Is NOT REQUIRED AT PRE-INDICTMENT
IDENTIFICATION CONFRONTATIONS.
Kirby v. Illinois (U.S. 1972)
Petitioner, after having been arrested, was confronted by a robbery
victim at the police station and was identified by the victim without the
petitioner's counsel being present.1 At the subsequent robbery trial, the
victim reaffirmed his previous identification and petitioner was convicted.
On appeal, petitioner argued that since he did not have the aid of counsel
at the identification confrontation, the per se exclusionary rule of United
States v. Wade2 and Gilbert v. California3 precluded the use of testimony
that related to such a confrontation at the trial. The Appellate Court of
Illinois upheld petitioner's conviction and held that the rule of Wade and
Gilbert did not apply to pre-indictment identification proceedings.4 The
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the state court's decision,
and in a plurality opinion,5 asserted that the right to counsel at identifica-
tion confrontations attaches only upon the initiation of "adversary judicial
proceedings." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
The right to counsel has been recognized by the Supreme Court as
"fundamental and essential to a fair trial."6 Moreover, the sixth amendment
guarantee 7 has not been limited to representation by counsel at the trial
itself, but has been applied by the Court to various pretrial confrontations
between the accused and the state." For example, counsel's aid was deemed
by the Court to be a constitutional requirement at the arraignment in
1. Petitioner, upon being stopped by the police, who were investigating a differ-
ent crime, produced identification items that bore the name "Shard." He was arrested
when he failed to explain adequately how these items came into his possession.
Thereupon, the victim was brought to the station by the police, and he identified the
petitioner in a face-to-face confrontation. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972).
2. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
3. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
4. People v. Kirby, 121 Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970).
5. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote a plurality opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justices Blackmun and Rhenquist joined. Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the result
and simply stated that he would not extend the Wade-Gilbert (see notes 14-24 and
accompanying text in!ra) per se exclusionary rule. He gave no other reasons for filing
a separate concurring opinion and stated no objections to any point raised in Justice
Stewart's opinion. 406 U.S. at 691. Dissenting were Justices Brennan, Douglas,
Marshall, and White.
6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
7. The sixth amendment provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. As early as 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court
recognized the period between the arraignment and the beginning of trial to be a
critical period of the proceedings. Denial of counsel's aid during that stage of the
proceedings was deemed to be a denial of due process of law since appointed counsel
was unable to prepare effectively for trial. Id. at 59.
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Hamilton v. Alabama,9 and at the preliminary hearing in Coleman v.
Alabama.I0 The Court adjudged both proceedings to be "critical stages"
of the prosecution wherein the presence of counsel might have protected
valuable rights fundamental to a fair trial." An additional test for deter-
mining the point at which the right to counsel attached in a criminal
proceeding was formulated by the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois.12 In
Escobedo, the Court held:
[W]hen the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory - when
its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession -
our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances
here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.' 3
In Wade, the Court decided that, for sixth amendment purposes, a post-
indictment lineup was a "critical stage" of the proceedings. 14 The Wade
Court reasoned that counsel's presence at identification confrontations would
have the effect of minimizing several hazards of potential unfairness in-
herent in identification procedures.' The hazards considered by the Court
to be important included: (1) improper suggestion by the prosecution
to the identifying witnesses, either intentionally or unintentionally ;16 (2)
the reluctance of witnesses to contradict their own prior identification at
the trial ;17 (3) the inability of the defense to reconstruct the confrontation
9. 368 U.S. 52 (1961). The Court decided that since the defense of insanity is
lost if not pleaded at the arraignment under Alabama law (ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 423
(1958)), such an arraignment is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding. 368 U.S.
at 53.
10. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). The Court determined that the "guiding hand" of counsel
is essential at the preliminary hearing to protect the accused against an "erroneous or
improper prosecution." The Court stated that counsel's presence at this stage of the
prosecution might have four effects. First, skilled cross examination of the witnesses
might expose fatal weaknesses in the state's case and lead the magistrate to refuse to
bind the accused over; second, interrogation of witnesses could serve as a basis for
impeachment at the trial; third, trained counsel can better discover the state's case
which would facilitate the preparation of a defense; fourth, counsel can be influential,
by his arguments at the preliminary hearing, in securing an early psychiatric examina-
tion or bail. Id. at 9.
11. 399 U.S. at 9; 368 U.S. at 53.
12. 378 U.S. 478 (1963). In Escobedo, the petitioner was arrested and taken to
police headquarters for interrogation in connection with the fatal shooting of his
brother-in-law eleven days before. The police interrogated petitioner and refused his
many requests to see his lawyer who was present in the police station. Finally, the
petitioner made a damaging statement which was admitted at the trial and led to
his conviction.
13. Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
14. 388 U.S. at 237.
15. Id. at 236.
16. The Wade Court found:
"The influence of improper suggestion upon the identifying witnesses probably
accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor - perhaps
it is responsible for more such errors than all factors combined."
Id. at 229, quoting WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1971).
17. The Wade Court relied on a secondary source for this proposition as well:
"It is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the
accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in
practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all
practical purposes be determined there and then before the trial."
388 U.S. at 229, quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades: Part 1,
11963] CRIM. L. REV. 479, 482.
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at the trial ;18 (4) the danger posed to objective identification when the
identifying witness was also the victim of the crime ;19 and (5) the unlikeli-
hood that suspects would be alert to subtle unfairness at identification
confrontations, and the probability that, even if the suspect were alert
to such unfairness, the unlikelihood that he would be believed at trial
over the positive identification of an eyewitness. 20 The danger created by
unfairness in identification proceedings was recognized by the Wade Court
as a threat to a defendant's right to confront meaningfully the witnesses
against him at the trial, as well as a threat to the reliability of evidence
procured from such proceedings.2 1 The Wade Court concluded:
The trial which might determine the accused's fate may well not be
that in the courtroom but that at the pre-trial confrontation, with the
state aligned against the accused, the witness, the sole jury, and the
accused unprotected against the overreaching, intentional or unin-
tentional, and with little or no effective appeal from the judgment
there rendered by the witness - "that's the man.
22
The Wade Court, therefore, created a per se exclusionary rule for testimony
derived from a post-indictment identification in the absence of counsel.
23
The question with which the Kirby Court was concerned involved a
determination of the scope of the Wade-Gilbert rule.24 The Court asserted
that the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings "is the starting point
of our whole system of adversary criminal justice" 25 and the point at which
the "explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable."' 26  The
Kirby majority looked to the decisions following Powell v. Alabama2 that
concerned the expanded application of the right to counsel and concluded
that, in each case, with the exception of Escobedo, the individual had
already been formally brought within the adversary system by some positive
action by the state.28 The Court dismissed Escobedo as inapposite to the
18. The Court recognized that an identification confrontation without the pres-
ence of counsel was analogous to problems caused by privacy in secret interrogations.
"Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to
what in fact goes on . . . ." 388 U.S. at 230, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
448 (1965). A concomitant danger goes to the reliability of testimony obtained under
such police-controlled conditions.
19. This danger was of particular relevance to the present case since Shard was
the victim of the robbery. See note 1 supra.
20. 388 U.S. at 218. The Wade Court stated further:
Improper influences may go undetected by a suspect, guilty or not, who experi-
ences the emotional tension which might be expected when one is confronted with
potential accusers.
Id. at 231, citing Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 17, at 489.
21. 388 U.S. at 235.
22. Id. at 235-36.
23. Id. at 240-41.
24. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), applied the Wade per se ex-
clusionary rule to state criminal trials. Id. at 273.
25. 406 U.S. at 689.
26. Id. at 689-90.
27. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
28. Id. at 688-89. See generally Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) ; Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
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present case, saying that the purpose of the Escobedo decision was "to
guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination .. .
[and] not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such."' 29 The
Wade case was distinguished on the grounds that the Wade confrontation
occurred after the indictment.30 The Kirby Court asserted, however, that
a suspect would, nevertheless, have some constitutional recourse - that is,
through the fifth and fourteenth amendments - if the identification pro-
cedure was found to be "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to ir-
reparable mistaken identification.' 1 In support of the proposition, Stovall
v. Denno3 2 was relied upon by the Court as having struck "the appropriate
constitutional balance between the right of a suspect to be protected from
prejudicial procedures and the interest of society in the prompt and purpose-
ful investigation of an unsolved crime. '33
The dissenting Justices rejected the majority's position that the
initiation of formal judicial proceedings was necessary before the right to
counsel at an identification confrontation could attach. They asserted that
the controlling principle for applying the right to counsel at pretrial
confrontations has been to determine if counsel's presence was necessary
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial. 34
Further, the dissent rejected the Court's assertion that Escobedo was
inapposite to the present case, noting that, in Wade, the Court had specific-
ally referred to the Escobedo decision as one that guaranteed that the
accused " 'need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.' 35 According to
the majority, counsel was deemed necessary by the Escobedo Court only
to protect the accused's fifth and fourteenth amendment rights against
compulsory self-incrimination ;36 the majority did not discuss the purpose
for counsel's presence. However, the dissenting Justices pointed out the
Wade Court's analysis that "nothing decided in the opinions in (Escobedo
and Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965) ] ) links the right to counsel
only to protection of Fifth Amendment rights"37 and concluded that the
purpose of counsel at a pretrial confrontation has been to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial from being damaged by unfairness at such
confrontations.3 8 Clearly, the majority's position that an accused is entitled
to counsel at a pretrial identification only after the initiation of formal
(1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52 (1961) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
29. 406 U.S. at 688-89.
30. Id. at 690.
31. Id. at 691.
32. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
33. 406 U.S. at 691.
34. Id. at 694.
35. Id., quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967).
36. 406 U.S. at 694.
37. Id., quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). For a dis-
cussion of the Miranda decision, see notes 60-62 and accompanying text in!ra.
38. 406 U.S. at 689.
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss3/7
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
judicial proceedings3 9 has created a new starting point for analyzing sixth
amendment questions. Significantly, this holding is somewhat difficult to
reconcile with the doctrine enunciated by the Court in prior cases.40 What
the Kirby Court has done is to shift the focus away from the rights sought
to be protected, in favor of an emphasis upon the procedural formalities
inherent in the criminal justice system. Absent such "formalities," these
"rights" do not attach and the necessity of counsel is, therefore, abrogated.
The dissenting Justices were not in agreement with this change in
emphasis and attached much greater significance to the Wade decision than
did the majority.41 The Wade Court had concluded that the post-indictment
lineup was a "critical stage" of the prosecution wherein a person was
entitled to counsel on the grounds that such confrontations contained many
hazards of potential unfairness. 42 The dissenting Justices in Kirby argued
that the Wade rationale should have been employed in the disposition of
the present case 43 because the hazards discussed in Wade are no less
damaging to an accused's chances for a fair trial simply because they
have occurred prior to formal state action. It can be argued that on
the facts of the present case the danger of improper suggestion by the
police is even greater. A witness in a face-to-face confrontation is likely
to consider that the police would not have apprehended a man whom they
did not have good reason to suspect was the perpetrator of the crime.
44
It does not seem that a witness at the trial would be any more likely to
contradict his prior identification of the suspect simply because the initial
identification took place prior to the initiation of formal state prosecutorial
action. The likelihood that unfairness at the confrontation would be
detected by a pre-indictment suspect is arguably slight since, not having
been formally charged by the state, the suspect is probably not as sensitive
to procedural abnormalities as he would be were he already indicted.
Furthermore, the pre-indictment suspect is certainly not as sensitive to
the potential problems as his attorney would be. Moreover, the inability
of a suspect identified at a pre-indictment confrontation to reconstruct
effectively any unfairness that he did detect and to be believed by the
jury is certainly not substantially different from the instance of a post-
indictment confrontation.
The Wade Court was concerned with the effects of unfairness at
identification proceedings on the quality both of proof and of representation
39. Id. at 691.
40. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
41. The dissent presented a detailed discussion of Wade. See 406 U.S. at 692-700
(dissenting opinion).
42. Id. at 696-97.
43. Id. at 696-97, 704. In a one sentence dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice White
asserted that the Wade and Gilbert cases governed the present case and compelled
reversal. Id. at 705.
44. The suggestion that the police had good reason to hold the suspect might
influence the witness to make a positive identification, when if a different identification
technique such as a lineup were used he might not. Young, Due Process Considera-
tions in Police Showup Practices, 6 CRiM. L. BULL. 373, 378 (1970).
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at trial and not with the initiation of formal judicial proceedings. 45 The
dissenting Justices in Kirby asserted that the Wade decision was not based
upon an "abstract consideration of the words 'criminal prosecutions' in
the Sixth Amendment," but was firmly grounded upon the serious threats
against a fair trial posed by unfairness at identification procedures. 46 The
Kirby majority, however, did not discuss the Wade Court's reasoning in
determining the Wade confrontation a "critical stage," but merely dis-
counted its applicability to the present case because the Wade confrontation
occurred after the indictment. 47
The Kirby Court asserted that unfairness in identification procedures
could be remedied by application of the safeguards provided by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It may be questioned, how-
ever, whether this method provides the most efficient constitutional vehicle
to lessen the hazards of potential unfairness in identification procedures.
The Supreme Court in Gilbert was essentially faced with the same dilemma
and noted that:
Only a per se exclusionary rule . . . can be an effective sanction to
assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's
constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup.
In the absence of legislative regulations adequate to avoid the hazards
to a fair trial which inhere in lineups as presently conducted, the
desirability of deterring the constitutionally objectionable practice
must prevail over the undesirability of excluding relevant evidence.48
The reason that the per se exclusionary rule was adopted was to deter
unfair police practices in the absence of legislative or local administrative
regulations. 49 Cases decided under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause certainly could not have the same deterrent effect upon unfair
police practices as could a per se exclusionary rule.
Traditionally, due process violations have been examined by the Court
on a case-by-case basis. In each instance, the totality of the circumstances
have been examined by the Court in order to determine whether some
compelling exigency justified the use of testimony obtained through preju-
dicial identification techniques.5 0 The Wade-Gilbert rule was not designed
to protect an individual from flagrantly unfair police identification pro-
cedures, but rather to protect him from the subtle abuses inherent in such
procedures which may derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.
The Kirby Court cited the due process approach applied in Stovall as the
45. 406 U.S. at 696.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 690.
48. 388 U.S. at 273.
49. The Wade Court asserted that the risks of abuse and unintentional sugges-
tion at lineup proceedings - potential impediments to a meaningful confrontation at
trial - were the bases of the per se exclusionary rule of tainted evidence obtained
at such proceedings in the absence of counsel. The rule was designed as a regulatory
measure in lieu of either legislative or administrative rules for such proceedings. 388
U.S. at 239.
50. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
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constitutional answer to questions involving the admissibility of evidence
obtained from pre-indictment identification confrontations.5' However, as
the dissent noted, the Stovall decision was decided on due process grounds
because the Court deemed that the purpose of the Wade-Gilbert rule would
best be served if applied prospectively. 52 In Stovall, the confrontation took
place before the commencement of any formal prosecution by the state
because Stovall's arraignment was postponed until he was able to retain
counsel.53 Yet, the Stovall Court stated that the accused raised "'the same
alleged constitutional errors in the admission of allegedly tainted identifica-
tion evidence that were before us [in Wade and Gilbert].' 54 The Stovall
Court found that case to be a fitting vehicle to determine if the Wade-
Gilbert rule was to be applied retroactively. 55 Thus, in a procedural
setting somewhat similar to the present case, the Court denied relief to
Stovall on the grounds that the purpose of the Wade-Gilbert rule was
best served if applied prospectively,56 and not because the confrontation
occurred before the initiation of formal judicial proceedings.
The effect of the Court's decision on future cases involving the right
to counsel prior to trial is in one respect very clear; the right does not
attach until the initiation of formal judicial proceedings. Thus, the initial
point of analysis for courts in future cases will not be whether the con-
frontation was a "critical stage" wherein valuable rights necessary to a
fair trial could be won or lost, but whether the state has formally charged
the accused with the commission of a crime. Therefore, there remains the
question as to whether the Escobedo holding - requiring counsel's presence
when the criminal process shifts from investigatory to accusatory -
should be applied to future cases. The Kirby Court said 57 that Escobedo
was limited to its facts by the Court in Johnson v. New Jersey.5  Not-
withstanding the fact that the Wade Court relied on Escobedo in its
decision and that Wade was decided after the Johnson case, the actual
51. 406 U.S. at 691.
52. The criteria the Stovall Court used to determine whether the per se ex-
clusionary rule was to be applied retroactively were:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards;(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards; and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of
the new standards.
388 U.S. at 297.
53. 406 U.S. at 702.
54. Id. at 703, quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 294 (1967).
55. 388 U.S. at 297.
56. Id.
57. 406 U.S. at 689.
58. 384 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1965). The Johnson Court dealt with the question of
the prospective application of the Escobedo rule and the Miranda guidelines. The
Court stated that the Miranda guidelines would apply prospectively from the date of
the Miranda decision because it was not clear from the holding of Escobedo that
such guidelines would be handed down by the Court. The plurality interpreted the
Johnson Court's recognition of the need for additional guidelines found by the Miranda
Court to insure fairness in situations different than those in Escobedo to be a limita-
tion of the Escobedo holding to its facts. Id. at 734. See note 12 and text accompany-
ing note 13 supra.
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language of Escobedo is narrow enough to sustain the Johnson
interpretation. 9
It would seem, however, that the importance of Escobedo was dimin-
ished by the Court in Miranda v. Arizona.60 The Miranda Court extended
the right to counsel to custodial interrogations in order to preserve the
defendant's right against self-incrimination. 6' The Miranda decision would
clearly apply to fact situations similar to EscobedoY' Thus it seems that
the relevance of Escobedo is more historical than practical.
The impact of the present decision on the administration of criminal
justice by the states remains to be seen. In Commonwealth v. Lopes,63
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has applied the decision of
the present case and has thereby overruled prior Massachusetts decisions
which had held that counsel was required at identification proceedings that
preceded the initiation of formal judicial proceedings. The Missouri
Supreme Court, in Arnold v. State,6 4 found that, in light of the Kirby
decision, defendants were entitled to the presence of counsel at any lineup
held after the complaint was filed, even if such lineup preceded the filing
of formal indictment or information. It is apparent then that it will be
within the province of each state to make its own determination as to
when the proceedings are "formal," thereby requiring the right to counsel.
Similarly, the impact of the present decision on police practices also
remains to be seen. Since it is now constitutionally permissible for lineups
to be held in the absence of counsel when such lineups precede the initiation
of formal judicial proceedings, it is quite conceivable that most identifica-
tion confrontations will now be conducted before the filing of formal charges.
While the Kirby Court did not suggest means for deterring unfairness
in identification procedures, it, nevertheless, did not deny the existence of
such potential unfairness. Thus, with the present decision, Wade will
conceivably lose much of its impact as a means for assuring fairness at
identification confrontations.
Prior to the present decision, the test for determining when the right
to counsel attached at pretrial confrontations was whether or not such a
confrontation was a "critical stage" in the proceedings. The Kirby Court
has abrogated this test and asserted that the initiation of formal judicial
proceedings is a condition precedent to the constitutionally required presence
of counsel. However, while the plurality determined that counsel was not
required at the pre-indictment identification confrontation, it did not refute
59. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
60. 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
61. Id. at 457-58.
62. The Miranda decision makes clear that once the police have a suspect in
custody and have focused their suspicion on him, as the police had done in Escobedo
(see note 12 supra), that suspect is entitled to warnings outlining his rights, including
his right to have counsel present at the interrogation.
63. Mass. ,_ 287 N.E.2d 118 (1972). A rape victim identified the defendant
as her assailant at a lineup that occurred two months after the crime. The identification
was admitted against the defendant and the court ruled that it was admissible in light
of Kirby, despite the fact that counsel was not present.
64. 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972).
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